The East Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 by Artige, Lionel
The East Asian Financial Crisis
1997-1998
Lionel Artige













1. Before the crisis
1.1 Before the crisis: Asia
1.2 Before the crisis: East Asia
2. The crisis 1997-1998
3. Causes of the crisis
4. Conclusion
5. To go further
3
Outline




Strengths of the Asian
economies
1.1 Before the crisis:
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∗ In the 1990s, before the financial crisis broke out in 1997, Asia was
the fastest growing region in the world.
∗ Output growth took place in a stable macroeconomic environment: 
decreasing inflation and sound fiscal policies.
∗ High growth and macroeconomic stability contributed to attracting
private foreign capital in Asia.
∗ Before the crisis, all the East Asian currencies were pegged to the 
US dollar (« soft » pegs) to provide macroeconomic stability. As 
most of these countries were debtor countries, their currencies
appeared to be overvalued in the 1990s.




ASEAN - 5 7.4%
Emerging and developing economies 3.6%
World 2.9%
Advanced economies 2.5%
Central and Eastern Europe 1.3%
Commonwealth of Independent States -8.2%
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.1%
Middle East and North Africa 4.6%
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.9%




∗ After high inflation in the 1970s and the debt crisis in the 
1980s in developing countries, some countries in the 
1990s, in particular in Asia, started to conduct a 
disinflation policy based on :
1) Sound fiscal policy to prevent indebtness
2) And ruling out of monetization of public debt
This policy was successful particularly in Asia.
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1.1 Before the crisis: disinflation
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Annual Inflation Rate  in % (end of year) 
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Weaknesses of the Asian
economies
1.1 Before the crisis:
11
∗ Asian countries recorded current account deficits between
1990 and 1996 in line with the neoclassical theory: fast-
growing countries tend to record faster dynamics of 
imports than exports.
∗ The corollary is the accumulation of external debt.
∗ The external debt became more of short-term maturity
over time and increasingly held by private creditors. 
Consequence: higher volatility of foreign capital flows.
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1.1 Before the crisis: weaknesses
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Current Account Deficit as a % of GDP (1990-1996)
Emerging market and developing economies Developing Asia ASEAN-5
Source: IMF
∗ The external debt to GDP ratio has remained stable in Asia
between 1990 and 1997, around 30% of GDP.
∗ The share of Asia in the external debt of developing countries 
has increased a lot in line with the increase in its share in the GDP 
of developing countries.
∗ The share of short-term external debt has increased between
1990 and 1997.
∗ The Asian external debt was increasingly held by private
creditors between 1990 and 1997.
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1.1 Before the crisis: External debt
1990 1996
Developing countries 37.3 33.4
Asia 31.0 27.9
Asia (excluding China and India) 46.3 40.0
Africa 59.3 58.0
Sub-Sahara 61.6 56.2
Middle East and Europe 29.1 30.0
Western hemisphere 40.2 34.4
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1.1 Before the crisis: External debt to GDP ratio 
(%)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1998
1990 1996
Developing countries 13.4 17.7
Africa 10.1 13.8
Asia 10.9 18.8
Middle East and Europe 23.3 22.9
Western hemisphere 13.1 16.8
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1.1 Before the crisis: short-term
external debt
Share of short-term instruments in total external debt (%)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1998
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1.1 Before the crisis: external debt
held by private creditors
Developing countries Asia
1990 1996 1990 1996
Official 48.0 43.3 51.6 41.2
Banks 32.1 26.4 29.9 32.1
Other Private
creditors 19.9 30.3 18.5 26.7
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1998
Share of creditors in total external debt (%)
East Asia
1.2 Before the crisis
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∗ Excellent macroeconomic fundamentals: high 
growth, moderate inflation, low public debt, high and 
stable saving and investment rates.
∗ the Achille’s heel of these countries:
Large current account deficits associated with « soft » 
pegs to the US dollar and a banking sector too
dependent of short-term foreign borrowing.
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1.2 Before the crisis: East Asia
Annual average growth
rate in %  (1989-1996)
Current accont balance in 
1996 (% of GDP)









1.2 Before the crisis: East Asian
countries
Source: IMF
In red: creditor countries; in black: debtor countries.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Inflation rate (%) in East Asian countries 1990-1996
Hong Kong SAR Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Source: IMF
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1.2 Before the crisis: national saving
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Gross national saving as a % of GDP in East Asia
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
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1.2 Before the crisis: national saving
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Total investment as a % of GDP in East Asia 
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
2. The Crisis 1997-1998
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2. The crisis: countries involved and 
spared
∗ The East Asian financial crisis started in 1997 in Thailand, the country of the region
with the largest current account deficit (see slide 18). Moreover, the country faced
at that time a budget deficit for the first time in a decade.
∗ In May 1997, the Thai baht was under speculative attacks. The Thai Central bank
raised interest rates and spent billions of its foreign reserves to defend the baht.
∗ On July 2nd 1997, the Thai baht was forced to float. The Central bank instituted a 
« managed float » with larger bands of fluctuation, i.e. accepted a devaluation of 
the currency. The baht dropped by 20%.
∗ The magnitude of the panic, unexpected, spread to other countries. Within a week
the dominoes began to fall…
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2. The Crisis
∗ The second and third largest current account deficit of the region in 1996 were found in Malaysia and 
Philippines respectively. 
∗ The announcement of the baht devaluation caused other regional currencies to experience pressure.
∗ On July 8th 1997, the Malaysian Cantral bank defends its currency (the ringgit) which is under speculative
attacks.
∗ On July 11th 1997,  after defending its currency for a few days, the Philippine Central bank decided to let the 
peso float. On the same day, the Indonesian Central bank widened its intervention band for the rupiah.
∗ On July 14th 1997, the Malaysian ringgit was forced to float. This led Singapore to let its currency
depreciate.
∗ On August 14th 1997, the Indonesian rupiah was also forced to float.




∗ On October 8th 1997, Indonesia asks the IMF and the World Bank for financial
assistance. This triggered a renewal of attacks against currencies more in the North.
∗ On October 17th 1997, despite being a creditor country, Taiwan is forced to let the 
New Taiwan dollar float. 
∗ On October 22th 1997, South Korea nationalised Kia Motors, which led Sandard and 
Poor’s to downgrade the South Korean foreign debt.
∗ On the same day, the Hong Kong Central bank raised interest rates from 7 to 300% 
to defend its currency. The stock market crashed by 10% that day and by 25% after
three days.
∗ For the first time, European and US financial markets feel the tornado. On October
27th , the Dow Jones fell by 7% (« mini crash »). 
∗ On November 17th 1997, the South Korean won was forced to float.
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2. The Crisis
∗ On November 21th 1997, South Korea requested IMF aid.
∗ On December 4th 1997, after Thailand and Indonesia, South 
Korea obtained a $57 billion aid package and, thank to an 
agreement with big foreign banks, avoided defaulting on 
its $100 billion short-term debt.
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2. The Crisis
∗ Severe recession in 1998 but income growth resumed in 
1999 at a high pace.
∗ The current account turned positive in most countries and 
remained so years after.
∗ The saving rate, on average, remained stable.
∗ The investment rate, on average, decreased but remained
stable.
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2. The Crisis in East Asia: short-lived
but severe
32
2. The crisis: GDP growth rate 
1997 1998 1999 2000 Average (1997-2000)
Hong Kong SAR 5.1 -6.0 2.6 8.0 2.4
Indonesia 4.7 -13.1 0.8 4.2 -0.9
Korea 5.8 -5.7 10.7 8.8 4.9
Malaysia 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.7 3.7
Philippines 5.2 -0.6 3.1 4.4 3.0
Singapore 8.5 -2.2 6.2 9.0 5.4
Taiwan Province of China 5.5 3.5 6.0 5.8 5.2
Thailand -1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.8 -0.7
China 9.3 7.8 7.6 8.4 8.3
India 4.6 6.0 6.9 5.7 5.8
Vietnam 8.2 5.8 4.8 6.8 6.4
Source: IMF
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2. The crisis: current accounts
Source: IMF
1997 1998 1999 2000
Hong Kong -1.3 -0.9 -1.0 -0.6
Indonesia -1.8 4.2 4.1 4.8
Korea -1.5 11.9 5.3 2.8
Malaysia -5.9 13.2 15.9 9.0
Philippines -4.7 2.1 -3.5 -2.8
Singapore -1.5 -1.8 -0.5 -0.1
Taiwan 2.4 1.2 2.7 2.7
Thailand -2.1 12.8 10.2 7.6
China 3.9 3.1 1.4 1.7
India -1.3 -0.9 -1.0 -0.6
Vietnam -5.7 -5.0 4.1 2.7
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gross national saving as a % of GDP in East Asia 1997-2004
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Source: IMF
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Total investment as a % of GDP in East Asia 1997-2004
Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand
Source: IMF
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2. The crisis: investment in China, 
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Total investment as a % of GDP in China, India and Vietnam
China India Vietnam
3. Causes of the crisis
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∗ The East Asian financial crisis is both a currency and banking crisis.
∗ The high growth rates and the sound macroeconomic results of 
East Asian countries  attracted, before the crisis, a lot of short-term
(often unhedged) and long-term (foreign direct investment) capital 
from foreign countries, especially from developed countries. These
capital inflows gave rise both to large current account deficits and 
inflows of foreign currency reserves.
∗ These capital inflows created real estate and asset bubbles. When
some of these bubbles started to burst in 1995-1996, investors
started to change their portfolio positions, hence, reducing short-
term capital inflows to these countries. The resulting downward
pressure on their currencies sparked off a flight to quality to 
Western financial markets. Short-term capital inflows suddenly
dried off leading to a currency crisis in these economies.
3. Causes of the crisis: international 
finance
39
∗ This currency crisis led to a banking crisis.
∗ In emerging and developing countries, investment finance generally
depends heavily on bank loans.  Despite structural problems in the 
banking sector in these countries, there were two specific characteristics
of the banking sector, which made things worse:
1. Maturity mismatch: the traditional maturity mismatch of the banking
sector (borrowing short and lending long) was particularly acute in 
these countries as banks used a lot of short-term interbank liquidity.
2. Currency mismatch: banks borrowed in foreign currencies (dollars), 
taking advantage of cheap foreign capital inflows, and lent to domestic
borrowers in domestic currency.
3. Causes of the crisis: international 
finance
40
∗ When investors’ mood reversed, the maturity mismatch worsened
creating a liquidity crisis for the banking sector.
∗ The flight to quality caused the depreciation of East-Asian currencies
leading to a much higher value (in domestic currency) of dollar-
denominated debts of the banking sector. This created a solvency crisis
for the banking sector.
∗ These two problems led to a turmoil in the banking sector calling for a 
rescue from the governments and the IMF.
∗ The deterioration of the banking sector’s balance sheet further deepened
the currency crisis, spreading the panic on the Asian financial markets.
3. Causes of the crisis: international 
finance
41
∗ Although the inefficiency of the East Asian banking sector was certainly a 
weakness, the excess of the booming years (too much domestic lending
and too much foreign short-term borrowing) coupled with severe
currency and maturity mismatch in the banking sector account for the 
sudden stop of economic activity in these countries.
∗ Credit crunch + sudden change in the consumers’ and investors’ mood led
to a short-lived but very strong recession.
∗ However, capital outflows, fiscal and monetary policy helped a lot in 
containing the crisis by turning the current accounts into surpluses and, 
hence, by stabilizing currencies.





∗ The East Asian financial crisis contaminated other emerging countries 
such as Russia, Brazil and other Latin American countries.
∗ The East Asian financial crisis emphazised the volatility and the fragility of 
the international financial markets.
∗ This crisis has had a tremendous impact on the way economic policies are 
monitored by governments in emerging and developing countries. More 
developed domestic financial markets and current account surpluses are 




5. To go further
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